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INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago, the Federal Sentencing Commission produced guidelines for
drug-trafficking offenses, which calculated mandatory sentences based on the
quantity of drugs a defendant could be held responsible for trafficking.1 The original
plan for the drug guidelines was to set the prescribed sentencing range according to
some sort of average based on actual sentences given for similar sets of facts.2 But
while the original sentencing commission developed the first set of guidelines,
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which imposed severe
mandatory minimum penalties for drug-trafficking offenses.3 For the Guidelines to
track the newly established mandatory minimums, the Commission (consistent with
1980s war-on-drugs hysteria)4 “incorporated [mandatory minimums] into the

1. This was a result of the 1987 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which were promulgated following
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (1987).
2. The Commission had collected data from a set of 10,500 federal cases. KATE STITH &
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 59
(1998).
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). While this act came to highly determinative conclusions
about drug offenders’ profiles, it was passed without the benefit of any hearings or reports related to
the act. See Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 n.8
(2015) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 5–6 (2002)).
4. See, e.g., Dave Zirin, The Death of Len Bias, My Generation’s One-Person Shock Doctrine, THE
NATION: DRUG WAR AND DRUG POLICY (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/
Death-Len-Bias-My-Generations-One-Person-Shock-Doctrine/ [http://perma.cc/WJW2-9787]
(discussing the widely-held belief that mandatory minimums were triggered by Bias’s overdose).
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Guidelines at their inception.”5 The Commission relied on the assumption that a
drug defendant’s culpability was meaningfully linked to the amount of drugs she
was found responsible for.6 Certain quantities were presumptively indicative of
kingpin status, and therefore, presumptively warranted kingpin-length sentences.7
Further, the first sentencing table was actually set above the mandatory minimum
to enable prosecutors to leverage sentencing reductions in exchange for defendants’
guilty pleas (to get credit for accepting responsibility)8 and cooperation.9 Thus, the
severity of drug sentences came both from the assumed link between quantity and
elevated status and from the goal of providing additional time for prosecutors to
bargain with to get defendants to quickly plead guilty.
While the sentencing table was pegged to high-level kingpins, kingpins have
largely failed to show up for the full incarceration10 feast.11 Instead, since the
Guidelines went into effect, federal prisons have been increasingly populated with
5. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60; Saris, supra note 3, at 5 n.24. The Commission failed
to rely on past sentencing practices in any systematic way. While there was a plan to linking sentencing
to the survey of past sentencing data, sentences were elevated for many offenses including drug
offenses. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60–61; see also id. at 68–69.
6. Notably, whether the offense involves a drug conspiracy, money taken in a bank robbery, or
a number of unauthorized immigrants in an unlawful immigration scheme, the “most common specific
offense characteristic found in the Sentencing Guidelines is quantity.” STITH & CABRANES, supra note
2, at 68–69. Yet, the Commission has neither stated nor explained “why these quantifiable
differences . . . are appropriate measures of the extent of individual culpability, or why they are more
significant than other sentencing factors that receive less weight in Guidelines sentencing calculations.”
Id. at 69.
7. Commentators have noted:
The apparent intent of the [mandatory minimum legislation] was to increase sentences
on major drug offenders. As Senator Robert Byrd stated: [¶] [A major drug offender] must
know that there will be no escape hatch through which he can avoid a term of years in the
penitentiary. . . . We divide these major drug dealers into two groups for purposes of fixing
what their required jail terms shall be: For the kingpins—the masterminds who are really
running these operations—and they can be identified by the amount of drugs with which
they are involved—we require a jail term upon conviction. If it is their first conviction,
the minimum is 10 years. . . . Our proposal would also provide mandatory minimum
penalties for the middle-level dealers as well. Those criminals would also have to serve time
in jail . . . a minimum of 5 years for the first offense.
Barbara Meierhoefer, The Severity of Drug Sentences: A Result of Purpose or Chance?, 12 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 34, 34 (1999) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. § 14301 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of
Sen. Byrd)).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
9. Saris, supra note 3, at 6; U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K1.1.
10. See, e.g., Jailhouse Nation: How to Make America’s Penal System Less Punitive and More
Effective, THE ECONOMIST ( June 20, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654619how-make-americas-penal-system-less-punitive-and-more-effective-jailhouse-nation [https://
perma.cc/HYQ7-QZAN].
11. The Commission estimates the most culpable drug traffickers, including high-level suppliers
and importers, and managers and supervisors account for only 10.9% and 1.1% of drug cases,
respectively. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 167 (2011) [hereinafter MANDATORY
MINIMUM REPORT ], http://www.ussc.gov/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatoryminimum-penalties/reportcongress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminal-justice-system
[https://perma.cc/5EK6-PBXV ].
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kingpins’ underlings: couriers,12 mules,13 street-level dealers, and others.14 This Note
presents modest proposals to roll back extremely harsh and inconsistent sentencing
practices that remain in effect for drug enterprise underlings.
In many ways, Congress and the Commission were wrong to assume that
quantity would be a reliable indicator of culpability. In the years since, the
Commission has suggested, “[M]andatory minimum penalties for drug offenses
may apply more broadly than Congress may have originally intended.”15 The Attorney
General’s office reflected this sentiment through its nationwide policy shift away
from alleging mandatory minimum triggering drug quantities against low-level drugtrafficking defendants.16 But since the quantity-based guidelines are still pegged
to the mandatory minimums, the Guidelines fail where drug-quantity-based
calculations impose kingpin culpability levels on couriers and mules.
The Guidelines and drug-trafficking statutes have left courts, prosecutors, and
probation officers ill equipped to deal with some of the most commonly seen drug
trafficking defendants, namely, those who are recruited—and often exploited—to
handle the riskiest part of the enterprise: the transportation.
This Note proposes significant fixes to one of the largest “classes” of federal
defendants, drug couriers and drug mules.17 This class has suffered a large
proportion of the impact of federal quantity-based guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentences. Drug couriers and drug mules who carry drugs in their vehicles
or on or in their person make up a substantial portion of federal drug offenders.18
12. The Commission defines a courier as a person who “[t]ransports or carries drugs using a
vehicle or other equipment.” Id.
13. A mule is defined as a person who “[t]ransports or carries drugs internally or on his or her
person.” Id.
14. A street-level dealer is one who “[d]istributes retail quantities (less than one ounce) directly
to users.” Id. While this Note focuses on mules and couriers, other low-level players, such as
street-level dealers and brokers, are included in the ranks of vulnerable drug-trafficking actors
facing treacherous sentencing exposure. See also Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How
U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (2013), https://www.HRW.org/report/
2013/12/05/Offer-You-Cant-Refuse/How-US-Federal-Prosecutors-Force-Drug-Defendants-Plead
[https://perma.cc/C589-CWTC]. Notably, the Mandatory Minimum Report indicates that “[a]mong
those offenders who received relief from the mandatory minimum penalty by providing substantial
assistance to the government, the Commission’s analysis shows that offenders who performed highlevel functions generally obtained relief for substantial assistance at higher rates than offenders who
performed low-level functions.” MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 171.
15. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 169 (emphasis added).
16. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Eric Holder to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division, (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentencesrecidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS6H-9AR8].
17. More than half of drug defendants (fifty-three percent) were placed in Criminal History
Category I, signifying that they had minor or no criminal history. “And only 6% of drug-trafficking
defendants could be classified as managers or leaders, i.e. individuals occupying the highest rungs
of a drug enterprise.” United States v. Leitch, No. 11-CR-00609 ( JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (Gleeson, J.).
18. The Commission estimates couriers alone account for twenty-three percent of drugtrafficking cases. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 167–68, fig. 8–9.
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But according to the Commission’s own research and given reputable attacks on
the drug war, couriers and mules should not fill federal prisons. Not only is it critical
to right the wrongs of quantity-based guidelines to remedy unjust and disparate
sentences, but it will also help alleviate woeful overcrowding in federal prison, while
also saving scarce resources.19
Section I of this Note lays the groundwork for analyzing courier and mule
sentencing by describing relevant sentencing guidelines and illustrating what is at
stake for low-level drug-trafficking defendants if they do not receive reductions for
minor or minimal role. Section II illustrates the unsuccessful attempts to achieve
working guidelines for couriers and mules. Quantity-based sentencing was based on
mistaken Congressional assumptions that lengthy sentences would reach high-level
drug traffickers. Commission research places couriers and mules at the lowest levels
of drug-trafficking hierarchies. Yet, the Mitigating Role Guideline,20 despite
repeated tinkering, lends itself to inconsistent interpretations and ideological
shaping that is out of sync with Congress’s intent and empirical research. Section II
describes the 2015 Amendment and argues that the application will remain troubled.
Section III outlines alternative considerations for future amendments that will
target low-level couriers and mules. These include analyzing jurisdictional obstacles,
examining application disparity between geographic regions, discussing the failure
of appellate decisions to keep pace with guideline amendments, and critiquing
assumptions by all actors involved in sentencing drug defendants, including courts,
probation officers, and defense attorneys.
Finally, Section IV proposes several solutions to the inconsistent, overly severe
regime described in Sections I–III. First, Role Cap, Section 2D1.1(a)(5),21 should be
extended to average participants in addition to minor and minimal participants. This
will lessen the impact for low-level defendants on the cusp of receiving mitigating
role adjustments. Second, and similarly, Section 2D1.1(b)(5)’s22 increase for
methamphetamine should only apply to defendants receiving aggravating role
adjustments. Third, the Mitigating Role Guideline, Section 3B1.2,23 should be
amended to contain a functional role analysis. This will encourage more consistent
application of the guideline and will permit meaningful appellate review for role
denials. Fourth, the Mitigating Role Guideline and the Aberrant Behavior
Guideline24 should be amended to disentangle the two. This will prevent judges
from conflating aberrancy and role factors. The two analyses should be expressly
separated by probation officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and sentencing
courts. Finally, the Mitigating Role Guideline should be amended with unequivocal
19. According to the Bureau of Prisons, the average yearly cost per inmate in 2014 was
$30,619.85. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Annual Determination of Average Cost of
Incarceration, 80 Fed. Reg. 12321, 12523 (Mar. 9, 2015).
20. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2.
21. Id. at § 2D1.1(a)(5).
22. Id. at § 2D1.1(b)(5).
23. Id. at § 3B1.2.
24. Id. at § 5K2.20.
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language to overrule “indispensability” jurisprudence. Case law should no longer
permit judges to deny mitigating role adjustments on a vague notion of
indispensability to a drug-trafficking operation. Doing so is arbitrary and conflates
role analysis with basic causation analysis necessary for every conviction.
I. GUIDELINES APPLICATION TO
LOW-LEVEL DRUG-TRAFFICKING DEFENDANTS
Even though the Guidelines are technically advisory under Booker,25 they
remain the starting point for sentencing calculations.26 And districts’ practices of
closely following the Guidelines remain deeply institutionalized.27
Courts calculate guideline sentences in drug cases by first calculating a
quantity-based “base offense level” under Section 2D1.1.28 If the quantity-based
offense level is between thirty-two and thirty-eight, defendants are eligible for an
additional reduction under Section 2D1.1(a)(5)’s Role-Cap provision as long as the
court grants a mitigating role reduction (described below). The main text of the
mitigating role guideline provides:
Section 3B1.2. Mitigating Role:
Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, decrease the offense level as
follows:
(a) If the defendant was a minimal participant in any criminal activity,
decrease by 4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a minor participant in any criminal activity,
decrease by 2 levels. In cases falling between (a) and (b), decrease by 3
levels.29
Courts then apply relevant adjustments to arrive at an “adjusted base offense
level” or “total offense level.” The mitigating role adjustment is critical in courier
and mule cases because it triggers a cascade effect that greatly decreases the kingpinquantity-based guidelines sentencing range. If a defendant can show she is
“substantially less culpable than the average participant,” then she is eligible for a
two-, three-, or four-level reduction from the calculated offense level.30 Since the
burden for seeking an adjustment falls on the party seeking it, the burden falls on
defendants, making it even more difficult for low-information defendants to prove
25. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
26. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (noting that district courts “should begin
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range . . . [a]s a matter of
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and
the initial benchmark”) (citation omitted).
27. Mona Lynch & Marisa Omori, Legal Change and Sentencing Norms in the Wake of Booker:
The Impact of Time and Place on Drug Trafficking Cases in Federal Court, 48 LAW & SOC. REV. 411,
419–21 (2014). “As a result, the underlying federal justice institutions are much more massive and
entrenched than they were prior to the Guidelines era, making them less pliable.” Id. at 441.
28. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 2D1.1.
29. Id. at § 3B1.2.
30. Id. at § 3B1.2 Comment 3(a).
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they qualify. If the offense involved the importation of methamphetamine, the
mitigating role adjustment then deactivates an otherwise applicable two-level increase
under Section 2D1.1(b)(5).31
Once an offense level is calculated, courts assign criminal history points by
calculating a defendant’s criminal history.32 The adjusted base offense level and the
criminal history category are plotted on a two-dimensional sentencing table with
offense levels on the vertical axis and the criminal history level on the horizontal
axis.33 Where the offense level and criminal history intersect, the table lists ranges
of months, which amount to “guideline sentences.”34
Table 1 demonstrates the offense-level calculations for two identical cases: one
in a mitigating-role-granting court, the other in a mitigating-role-denying court. In
the example, two defendants plead guilty to importing five kilograms of
methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(a)(1) and (b)(1)(H), which results in a
base offense level of thirty-eight under U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(c).35 With minor
role, the defendant’s base offense level is reduced by four points under Section
2D1.1(a)(5)’s role-cap proviso, she receives a two-point minor role adjustment
under Section 3B1.2, and is not subject to a two-point increase for
methamphetamine under Section 2D1.1(b)(5). After other common sentencing
reductions,36 the resulting offense level is twenty-three. In contrast, without a minor
role reduction, the other defendant does not receive the Role Cap adjustment and
she is penalized under the Methamphetamine Importation Guideline. There is a net
difference of eight points between the two. A total offense level of twenty-three
results in a sentencing range of 46–57 months; a total offense level of thirty-one
yields a range of 108–135 months. Thus, there is a difference of sixty-two months
at the low ends and seventy-eight months at the high ends for the exact same
conduct. This difference relies on whether a courier carries her burden of showing
she is substantially less culpable than the average participant. This is a very difficult
task for couriers who often only know their recruiter by an alias.

31. Id.
32. See id. at ch. 4.
33. See id. at 420.
34. Id.
35. See id. at § 2D1.1(c) (depicting the Drug Quantity Table, which sets offense levels based on
the quantity of drugs involved in the offense).
36. See infra notes 37–38.
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Table 1: Methamphetamine Importation with and Without Role
Minor Role Adjustment
No Role Adjustment
38
Base Offense Level (BOL)
Base Offense Level (BOL)
34
BOL Role-Cap [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)]
BOL Role-Cap [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)]
-3
Acceptance of Responsibility
Acceptance of Responsibility
-2
Average Role
Minor Role
Methamphetamine Importation N/A Methamphetamine Importation
-2
Safety Valve
Safety Valve37
38
Fast Track
-4
Fast Track
Resulting Offense Level
23
Resulting Offense Level
Criminal Hist. Category I
Criminal Hist. Category I
Guideline Range:
Guideline Range:
46-57 months
108-135 months

38
N/A
-3
0
+2
-2
-4
31

Thus, in this example, a difference of about five years to six-and-a-half years
hinges on the mitigating role determination. While judges have discretion to depart
or vary from the guideline range, mitigating role causes their departure or variance
to begin at a vastly different place, making denial devastating.
II. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE WORKING MITIGATING ROLE
AND ROLE CAP GUIDELINES
In 2014, U.S. Sentencing Commission Chair Hon. Patti B. Saris cited couriers
and mules—without qualification—as examples of defendants who qualify for
mitigating-role adjustments.39 The Sentencing Commission’s research has placed
them at the bottom of the drug-trafficking-organization role-culpability hierarchy.40
In 2002, the Commission issued a report to the Congress on the structure of
cocaine-trafficking organizations and the effect of that empirical data on sentencing
for drug offenses.41 Since then, the Commission has constantly maintained the view
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ); U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at §§ 2D1.1(b)(17), 2D1.11(b)(6), 5C1.2.
Section 3553(f )(1)–(5) and Guideline Section 5C1.2 allow some defendants relief from statutory
minimum sentences if they have a limited criminal history, did not use violence in the offense, did not
harm anyone in the offense, did not have an aggravated role, and underwent a debrief with the
government.
38. Fast Track is an early disposition program used in some jurisdictions with the goal of
preserving prosecutorial resources in exchange for defendants waiving certain trial rights, accepting
responsibility, and pleading guilty. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K3.1 (“Upon motion of the
Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition
program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for
the district in which the court resides.”).
39. Saris, supra note 3, at 6.
40. See. e.g., MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 166–67.
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY at 36 (May 2002) [hereinafter COCAINE SENTENCING REPORT], http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/
200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PET-Q7NY].
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that couriers and mules are acting out “less serious functions.”42 In one study, the
Commission listed couriers and mules as eighth and ninth out of nine categorical
roles listed in descending order of culpability.43 Similarly, another study placed
couriers and mules at thirteenth and fourteenth in an eighteen-level hierarchy of
active participants in drug-distribution conspiracies, which is in the bottom third of
participants.44
But across the United States, many judges ignore the empirical data, and
neither the guidelines, nor the courts of appeal impede them. In the Ninth Circuit,
which handles some twenty-one percent of the Country’s drug-trafficking cases,45
and the Fifth Circuit, which handles another eighteen percent,46 mitigating role
is regularly denied by some judges on facts that qualify for maximum role
reductions in other parts of the country. For years, couriers and mules had a nearequal chance of getting charged under mandatory minimums as not.47 This
difference—in a system seeking to reduce disparity between similar offenders—
was very alarming. While this radical difference in charging and convictions for the
same functional role may have been lessened by Attorney General Eric Holder’s
2013 Memorandum,48 getting a defendant “out of the mandatory minimum frying

42. Id. at 36–37.
43. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 166–67, 173, fig. 8-12.
44. COCAINE SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 41, at C-3, tbl. C1.
45. In Fiscal Year 2013, the Ninth Circuit had over 21% of the countries’ drug trafficking cases.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE USSCFY13 (Unless otherwise specified, when referring
to Commission statistics, specific years refer to the “fiscal years.”). In 2014, the Southern District
of California alone had 1,494 (seven percent) of the country’s 21,323 drug trafficking cases. See
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN,
http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2014/stats_CAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8CZ-FWWT]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, NAT’L DATA, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/stats_Nat.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZC7S-3CRB].
46. In 2013, the Fifth Circuit had over eighteen percent of federal drug trafficking cases.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 DATAFILE USSCFY13.
47. MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 167 (“Only two functions—Courier
and Mule—were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty in less than half of
the cases (49.6% and 43.1%, respectively).”).
48. The Attorney General instructed prosecutors to avoid charging mandatory-minimumactivating charges against “certain non-violent low-level drug offenders.” Holder, supra note 16, at 1.
The Attorney General’s 2013 memorandum was issued following the Supreme Court’s holding in
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013), that “[f ]acts that increase the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt.” As such, the Attorney General instructed federal prosecutors not to use charging
language that would trigger the mandatory minimums for defendants who (1) could not be shown to
have used violence or committed an offense involving minors or death or serious bodily injury; (2) were
not organizers, leaders, managers or supervisors; (3) did not have significant ties to drug traffickers;
and (4) did not have significant criminal history. Holder, supra note 16, at 2.
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pan” still only gets her “into the Guidelines fire.”49 For couriers and mules, a
mitigating role adjustment is the only way to avoid getting burned.
The quantity-based guidelines are problematic for many reasons, and require
large overhauls.50 Quantity-based guidelines for drug offenses were never linked to
the heartland of district court sentences.51 Drug-trafficking guideline ranges have
been criticized for not being based on empirical data, Commission expertise, or the
actual culpability of defendants.52 As authors Kate Stith and José Cabranes have
stated, while the Commission started with the goal of basing the guidelines on past
sentences, it ultimately failed to do so in “any systematic way.”53 Instead, the Guideline
ranges were pegged to mandatory minimum sentences enacted in 1986, two years
after the Sentencing Reform Act.54
In the right political climate, the low-level defendants discussed here will be
better served by a system that takes them out of the quantity-based paradigm
altogether.55 So will society be better served if we implement evidence-based
practices based on empirical data rather than tough-on-crime political stances. For
now, the subject guidelines require immediate fixes to ensure existing adjustments
are given more broadly and more consistently. Without intervention, some judges,
circuit courts, and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, will perpetuate outmoded protocols that
penalize couriers and mules with kingpin calculations. Circuits continue to affirm
mitigating role denials even where facts indicate that defendants are situated on the
lowest rungs of drug-smuggling hierarchies.56

49. Memorandum Explaining a Policy Disagreement with the Drug Trafficking Offense
Guideline at 2, United States v. Diaz, No. 11-CR-00821-2 ( JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *9, *18
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (Gleeson, J.) [hereinafter Diaz Memorandum].
50. See, e.g., Smarter Sentencing Act, S. 502, 114th Cong. (2015). The SSA had bipartisan
support. Among its goals, it aimed to reduce over-criminalization.
51. Before the passage of the ADAA, the guideline ranges were intended to be based an average
or heartland of typical sentences. See Saris, supra note 3, at 5 n.24. But the mandatory minimums made
this virtually impossible, so the empirical data collected for this purpose was discarded, and the
sentencing table was instead linked to the arbitrarily created mandatory minimums.
52. Diaz Memorandum, supra note 49, at 2.
53. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 60 (citation omitted).
54. See Sentencing Reform Act, supra note 1; Anti-Drug Abuse Act, supra note 3.
55. See Dan Honold, Quantity, Role, and Culpability in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 389, 405–07 (2014). Hanold argues that functional role analysis should be built
directly into § 2D1.1(a)(5) so that role is prioritized over quantity-based analysis. He argues that
[b]ecause quantity improperly aggregates cases, no amount of offense level tweaking will
lead to just results over the long run of quantity-based sentencing. Role-based sentencing,
on the other hand, has the potential to achieve just results in many cases, given that the
offense levels are properly adjusted to reflect societal attitudes towards a given role.
Id. at 407. Similarly, others have argued for a more limited offense level role cap. See Mark Osler, More
Than Numbers: A Proposal for Rational Drug Sentences, 19 FED. SENTENCING REP. 326, 326–28 (2007).
56. See PROBATION OFFICERS ADVISORY GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, Letter to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, at 4 (Mar. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Letter to Saris]
(discussing the circuit split in the application of mitigating roles).
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A. The Contours of the Mitigating Role Guideline Remain Unclear to Judges and Many
Others Even After Years of Tinkering Amendments
In 2010, the Commission surveyed district court judges on their perception of
the Mitigating Role Guideline.57 A total of 639 judges responded;58 66% agreed that
“[t]he distinction between ‘minor’ and ‘minimal’ participant should be explained
more clearly.”59 Since then, no explanation has been offered, meaning that judges
are still unclear on the standard. As the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment took
effect, the U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group did not understand the purpose
of the guideline.60 Since judges rely on probation officers to calculate the applicable
guidelines for cases, the probation officers’ confusion is likely to be reflected by the
sentencing courts.
Recent amendments have tried unsuccessfully to clarify the Mitigating Role
Guideline’s purpose and standard.61 Even with the 2015 Mitigating Role
Amendment in place, judges still lack guidance as to whether they can compare
hypothetical participants neither party knows about.62 The cases cited by the
Commission for the Amendment are not the most recent circuit cases.63 The most
recent cases appear more permissive of district courts’ engagement in hypothetical
role analysis.64 Even though federal courts have almost thirty years of experience
with the Guidelines, Commission amendments still have a tenuous and unclear
relationship with circuit law. The 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment presents no
exception, leaving courts of appeal to contemplate the basic effects of the
amendment on current jurisprudence on the prior version of the guideline.
B. The Impact of the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment
On the heels of the Commission’s incremental 2014 “Drugs-Minus-Two”
Amendment,65 the 2014–2015 amendment cycle produced an amendment to the

57. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WFT-3VYT].
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 14.
60. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, United States v. Elenes, 591 F. App’x 562 (2015)
(No. 14-50156) (denying minor role in part because the defendant’s role exceeded that of a hypothetical
drug-smuggling-compartment welder).
63. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend 794, at 117.
64. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, United States v. Elenes, 591 F. App’x 562 (2015)
(No. 14-50156).
65. The Drugs-Minus-Two Amendment came about following Commission research showing
that drug trafficking sentences were overly punitive guidelines. The Amendment gave a slight reduction
for nearly all levels of drug defendant involvement. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C. Notably, it
reduces—with exceptions—a broad range of drug trafficking sentences, but had no particularized
impact on which defendants qualify for a mitigating role reduction. Id.
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Mitigating Role Guideline’s application notes.66
As amended, Guideline 3B1.2’s application notes provide in part:
3. Applicability of Adjustment.—
(A) Substantially Less Culpable than Average Participant.— This section
provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in
committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the
average participant in the criminal activity.
A defendant who is accountable under §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) only
for the conduct in which the defendant personally was involved and who
performs a limited function in the concerted criminal activity is not
precluded from consideration for may receive an adjustment under this
guideline. For example, a defendant who is convicted of a drug trafficking
offense, whose role participation in that offense was limited to
transporting or storing drugs and who is accountable under §1B1.3 only
for the quantity of drugs the defendant personally transported or stored is
not precluded from consideration for may receive an adjustment under
this guideline.
...
(B) Conviction of Significantly Less Serious Offense.— If a defendant has
received a lower offense level by virtue of being convicted of an offense
significantly less serious than warranted by his actual criminal conduct, a
reduction for a mitigating role under this section ordinarily is not
warranted . . . .
(C) Fact-Based Determination.— The determination whether to apply
subsection (a) or subsection (b), or an intermediate adjustment, is based
on the totality of the circumstances and involves a determination that is
heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.
In determining whether to apply subsection (a) or (b), or an
intermediate adjustment, the court should consider the following
non-exhaustive list of factors:
(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and
structure of the criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or
organizing the criminal activity; and
(iii) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the
criminal activity.
4. Minimal Participant.— Subsection (a) applies to a defendant described
in Application Note 3(A) who plays a minimal role in the criminal
concerted activity. It is intended to cover defendants who are plainly
among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group.
Under this provision, the defendant’s lack of knowledge or understanding

66.

Id. at amend. 794.
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of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others
is indicative of a role as minimal participant.
5. Minor Participant.— Subsection (b) applies to a defendant described in
Application Note 3(A) who is less culpable than most other participants in
the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal.
6. Application of Role Adjustment in Certain Drug Cases.— In a case in
which the court applied §2D1.1 and the defendant’s base offense level
under that guideline was reduced by operation of the maximum base
offense level in §2D1.1(a)(5), the court also shall apply the appropriate
adjustment under this guideline.67
While the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment announced desirable policy
preferences, it failed to address principle concerns of Federal and Community
Defenders (who spoke on behalf of court-appointed defense attorneys throughout
the nation)68 and U.S. Probation Officers (whose views are relied on heavily—often
followed verbatim—by district courts).69 Unfortunately, while the U.S. Probation
Department and the Department of Justice participate directly in Commission
operations, the Commission has been deprived of direct participation of critical
stakeholders, including Federal Defenders.70 This imbalanced structure may have
played a part in maintaining the Commission’s severe, mandatory sentencing
structure from the time of the Guidelines’ inception until almost twenty years later
when the Guidelines were rendered advisory by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booker.71 Critical to Defenders’ recommendations for the 2015 Amendment was a
request that an amendment “clearly delineate which functional roles should
generally be considered mitigating roles.”72 Such delineation would lessen the
amendment’s susceptibility to vast differences between how different individuals in
the system interpret the meaning of “average” drug traffickers. It would also follow
the same structure as aggravating role adjustments, which are based on the
defendants’ functional roles.

67. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2.
68. See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to “Mitigating Role,” “Single Sentence
Rule,” and “Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity” Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 1 (Mar. 12,
2015) [hereinafter Mitigating Role Statements] (statement of Jon Sands, Fed. Def. for the Dist. of
Ariz. on behalf of the Fed. and Community Def.’s).
69. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56.
70. Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1631, 1642–43 (2012)
(explaining that the Commission operates without the transparency imposed on other government
agencies, and without any counterweight to ever-present ex-officio Justice Department commentary
and ex parte communication). Baron-Evans and Stith also argue that “[w]ithout enforceable constraints,
the Commission failed to take into account the views and evidence presented by the judiciary, the
defense bar, and others who advised against its proposals,” and that the Commission “promulgated
amendments materially different from those originally proposed for comment, to which stakeholders
had no opportunity to respond.” Id. (quotations omitted).
71. See id. at 1646–48; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
72. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68.
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While the defense bar’s views did not make the final cut of the amendment,
the U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group (POAG), with signatories from all
circuits, was equally unsatisfied with the text of the final amendment. POAG
indicated the following:
The purpose of the amendment appeared vague. Is the intent of the amendment
to expand the analysis of the defendant’s conduct? It is unclear when
determining if the reduction applies if the analysis should include a
comparison of similar/typical offenses or the defendant’s role within the
charged offense. POAG believes limiting the assessment to the defendant’s
role in the “criminal activity” rather than his/her activity in the typical
crime, does not rectify the disparity across the country in how the
mitigating role adjustment is applied, and it may even have the reverse
effect by creating more ambiguity. POAG believes the application of
the mitigating role adjustment will continue to be applied inconsistently
based on the interpretation in each district or circuit. POAG recommends
the Commission look at case law from the circuits that apply the adjustment
infrequently to ascertain the barriers that may inhibit application. This may offer
insight and guide the Commission in developing expanded language or
formulating examples in the application notes. Much more than a two level
reduction hinges on minor role. When considering the mitigating role cap
in USSG §2D1.1, there is a potential swing of seven offense levels73 for
defendants that are categorically denied mitigating role in one district and
given the adjustment in another. POAG agrees §3B1.2 needs to be revised
because it is one of the most inconsistently applied sections across the
country.74
Since judges rely heavily on probation officers to calculate applicable
guidelines for a case, probation officers’ opinions are a bellwether of judicial
understanding.75 Probation officers are a powerful force in the sentencing process.
Their presentence reports serve as a starting point for offense-level calculation and
largely define the “playing field” for formal sentencing discussions.76 At sentencing,
some judges go so far as to read directly from probation officers’ undisclosed
sentencing recommendations.77 Critically, if probation officers are confused by the
guideline, it is likely that confusion will percolate up to the judges who rely on
probation officers’ reports.

73. The potential swing can be even greater than when minimal role adjustments stand to reduce
a base offense level from up to thirty-eight to thirty-two under §§ 2D1.1(a)(5) and/or 2D1.1(b)(5) is
“deactivated” by mitigating role for a methamphetamine offense that would otherwise trigger §
2D1.1(b)(5).
74. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3–4 (emphasis added).
75. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 70, at 1638 n.29, 1692.
76. At the 2015 Annual Sentencing Commission training, Commission Vice Chair Judge Charles
Breyer asked during a plenary session for the hundreds of probation officers and judges to raise their
hands if they have ex parte presentence meetings, and well over half of the room raised their hands.
(Observed by the author).
77. Id.
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Other advocates and stakeholders downplayed the potential impact of the
Amendment. At the 2015 U.S. Sentencing Commission Annual Training Seminar,
District of Washington, D.C. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Arvind Lal predicted little
change from the 2015 Amendment because he believes courts are largely applying
mitigating role reductions as they should be.78 District of Puerto Rico Judge,
Gustavo Gelpí, in the same panel, noted that First Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent gives judges extensive leeway to deny role adjustments—for example,
based on the quantity of the drugs.79 Indeed, groups with similar values have
expressed different expectations about the proposed amendment’s desirability.80
This is problematic. All parties to criminal cases must mutually understand the
guideline for it to be effective. The guideline is not just critical at the sentencing
hearing. Prosecutors and defense attorneys must also understand mitigating role
starting from their plea negotiations (to inform their risk calculi regarding trial).
As discussed throughout this Note, the Mitigating Role Guideline is plagued
by severe application problems, which the 2015 Amendment fails to adequately
address. Unlike the 2014 Drugs-Minus-Two and earlier crack cocaine amendments,
the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment was not buttressed by substantial research
outlining the problem the Amendment is aimed at addressing. Rather, the 2015
Amendment—focusing on two circuit rules, which were not the only possible
options—reads more like a mere cosmetic adjustment:
The amendment generally adopts the approach of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, revising the commentary to specify that, when determining
mitigating role, the defendant is to be compared with the other participants
“in the criminal activity.” Focusing the court’s attention on the individual
defendant and the other participants is more consistent with the other
provisions of Chapter Three, Part B.81
Thus, following the Amendment, courts are told to limit their comparisons to
a smaller universe of participants in the offense, and are given a sprinkling of
additional factors to consider.82 But the First Circuit—singled out by the
Amendment—has already ignored the Amendment in United States v. Carela.83 In
78. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Panel, Role in the Offense, Sept. 17, 2015 (observed by the
author) (notes on file with the author).
79. Id.
80. Federal and Community Defenders expressed “reservations” about whether minor tweaks
in guideline language would achieve the amendment’s goal. See Mitigating Role Statements, supra note
68. Meanwhile, for example, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, professed overall acceptance for
the proposal. See Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Comment Letter on Proposed Amendment
No.5-Mitigating Role to the Sentencing Guidelines at 2–3 (Mar. 18, 2015) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/20150318/FAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R6YP-VUVN].
81. U.S.S.G, supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend 794, at 117.
82. Id. (noting that the factors include: “(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the
scope and structure of the criminal activity; (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in
planning or organizing the criminal activity; and (iii) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit
from the criminal activity.”).
83. See 805 F.3d 374 (1st Cir. 2015).
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Carela, the First Circuit continued the very test the Commission disavowed in the
2015 Amendment.84 Where the Commission expressly clarified the Seventh/Ninth
Circuit rule was the correct one, the First Circuit flaunted its incongruent rule days
after the Amendment became law.85 Yet, even if courts make an effort to follow the
Amendment, serious application problems remain unaccounted for and
unaddressed.
III. THE GUIDELINES SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ADDRESS THE KINGPINLENGTH SENTENCES RECEIVED BY MANY LOW-LEVEL COURIERS AND MULES
In drug cases, the mitigating role adjustment (when granted) ostensibly
minimizes the impact of the kingpin-quantity-based guidelines on low-level
defendants. But these low-level defendants are still vulnerable to the Guidelines’
brutally long sentences. To make matters worse, defendants with the lowest
involvement often face harsher consequences than others with greater involvement
because—in a system built around cooperation—these pawns of the drug
conspiracies have no information to bargain with.86 Worse yet, many—lacking
experience in the criminal justice system—simply spill their guts at the wrong time.87
If a defendant invokes her Miranda rights upon arrest, there is a greater chance she
will get more credit for information she actually has if it is turned over directly to
the prosecutor who handles her case.88 Plus, if she lacks knowledge of the drug
trafficking organization, a defendant cannot prove she is substantially less culpable
than the average participant. Thus, without such proof she will not even get a
mitigating role reduction—let alone a reduction for cooperation.
A. Targeting Jurisdictional Obstacles
First, the Commission should amend the mitigating role guideline by directly
targeting obstacles in jurisdictions that tend not to apply it.89 As discussed above,
the same set of facts judged in different federal jurisdictions can result in wildly
divergent sentencing outcomes. This results from a variety of factors enabled by an
insufficiently clear guideline. Other guidelines are not activated or deactivated until
84. Id. at 384 (describing that for a defendant to qualify for a minor role reduction, “he must
satisfy a two-pronged test: (1) ‘he must demonstrate that he is less culpable than most of those involved
in the offenses of conviction;’ and, (2) ‘he must establish that he is less culpable than most of those
who have perpetrated similar crimes.’”).
85. Although the court decided Carela on November 4, 2015, id. at 374, the Amendment took
effect on November 1, 2015. U.S.S.G., supra note 8.
86. See MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 11, at 171 (“[O]ffenders who performed
high-level functions generally obtained relief for substantial assistance at higher rates False The highest
rates of relief based on substantial assistance were for Manager (50.0%) and Organizer/Leader (39.1%).
The lowest rates of relief based on substantial assistance were for Mule (19.5%), Street-Level Dealer
(23.4%), and Courier (27.1%).”).
87. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 14, at 73.
88. See id. (“The disadvantage low-level drug offenders face compared to those at a higher level
is called the ‘cooperation paradox.’”).
89. See Letter to Saris, supra note 56, at 3.
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mitigating role is granted, so most courier defendants face a treacherous “cliff” at
the time of sentencing. While mitigating role reduces the offense level by only two
to four points, it has the potential to trigger substantial additional reductions
through Role Cap and the Methamphetamine Enhancement.90
1. Geographic Disparity
Disparate application of mitigating role adjustments arbitrarily elevates
sentences for similarly situated defendants in different geographic regions. Sixteen
years ago, a law review comment by former Parole Commission case analyst,
Timothy Tobin, illustrated federal courts’ disparate, unpredictable treatment of drug
couriers91 with the anecdote of a “peasant farmer” recruited by a Columbian92 drug
trafficking organization to bring three kilograms of heroin to the United States on
a commercial airline flight. Tobin pointed out the unfairness that would likely result
depending on which U.S. city the courier landed in and was caught in. Depending
on the district court judge sentencing the courier, and that judge’s interpretation of
the mitigating role guideline, the sentence could either be between 151–188 months,
between 121–151 months, or between 97–121 months.93
Fast-forward from 1999 to the present, we see a situation in which much
tinkering has occurred yet much remains the same, or worse. Couriers or mules are
devastatingly worse off in some districts and before some judges—and this depends
mainly on where they are arrested, which Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecutes them,
and which judge they face at sentencing.94 If they arrive in the Middle District of
Florida or get the wrong judge in the Southern District of California, even first-time
couriers or mules can expect no mitigating role adjustments, and very long
sentences.95 If they arrive in another district, such as the Eastern District of New

90. See supra Table 1.
91. Timothy P. Tobin, Comment, Drug Couriers: A Call for Action by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1999).
92. Notably, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the principal drug-smuggling corridor shifted
from the Colombia-Eastern United States to Northwest Mexico-Southwest United States as the DEA
crackdown on Colombian cartels enhanced the market control of Mexican cartels. See HOWARD
CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL PASO AND
JUÁREZ 41 (Univ. of Texas Press 2009). Thus, the typical courier was transformed from an airline
passenger arriving at an eastern U.S. airport to an automobile driver arriving at a terrestrial port of entry
or a pedestrian carrying drugs across the border on their person.
93. Tobin, supra note 91, at 1055.
94. See Letter from Marjorie Meyers, Chair, Fed. Def. Sentencing Guidelines Comm.,
Fed. Pub. Def. for the S.D. Tex., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 4 n.4
( July 25, 2014).
95. Compare United States v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming a
forty-six-month sentence and mitigating role denial for 11.64-kilograms-of-cocaine importation
by a defendant in Criminal History Category I who drove a truck across the border with the drug
hidden in it), with United States v. Leitch, No. 11–CR–00609 ( JG), 2013 WL 753445, at *4, 14
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2013) (accepting deferred prosecution agreement dismissing charges entirely for
13.2-kilograms-of-cocaine importation by defendant in Criminal History Category I who crossed the
border on a commercial airline flight with the drug hidden in her luggage).
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York, they may receive a two- or four-level mitigating role reduction, along with
accompanying reductions under Sections 2D1.1(a)(5) and 2D1.1(b)(5).96
Further, if a courier has the luck of being in certain districts, she may even get
a non-custodial sentence through a diversion program.97 In the 2015 Fiscal Year, in
the Eastern District of New York, over ten percent of drug trafficking offenders
received a non-custodial sentence.98 In contrast, in the District of Puerto Rico, only
eight out of 580 (roughly 1.4%) drug trafficking offenders received a non-custodial
sentence.99 The difference in average drug trafficking sentences across districts is
stark. Admittedly, districts may have wide variation as to the drug type and quantity
associated with drug offense. However, the fact that the Southern District of
California has an average sentence of forty-five months,100 the Western District of
Texas has an average of sixty-three months,101 while Puerto Rico has an average of
seventy-eight months102 is likely significant. Nationally, mitigating role adjustments
are deployed minimally. In 2013, just 17.9% of drugs cases benefited from
mitigating role adjustments.103 In some districts, the adjustment remains woefully
underused. In 2014, just 6.5% of District of Puerto Rico cases received a mitigating
role reduction.104 In contrast, in the same year, courts in the Southern District of
California granted a mitigating role adjustment in 32.1% of cases.105

96. See Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *13–14 n.26 (describing the Attorney-General-authorized
early disposition program for “drug courier cases arising out of John F. Kennedy International Airport”
in the Eastern District of New York).
97. Notwithstanding the Guidelines’ virtual eradication of non-custodial sentences, in recent
years, diversionary programs have sprouted up in districts across the country (including in California,
Connecticut, Illinois, South Carolina, and Washington). See id. at *3 n.25. Notably, some programs are
pre-plea diversion, which means that defendants may completely avoid a conviction if they make
progress in rehabilitation.
98. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, EASTERN
DISTRICT N.Y., http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2015/stats_NYE.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH4M-CZPH].
99. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, P.R., http://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2015/stats_PR.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYY5-NJUD].
100. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2015 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, CAL.,
SOUTHERN, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2015/stats_CAS.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUJ2-NYFC].
101. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2014 GUIDELINE SENTENCES, TEX.,
WESTERN, http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2014/stats_TXW.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZA9-S9RM].
102. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 99.
103. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at A-42, http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/2013_
Annual_Report_Chap5_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/G56Q-2LVN].
104. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, http://isb.ussc.gov/Login (Select “All Tables and Figures,” then select “Guideline
Application” and click on “Offenders Receiving Each Chapter Three Guideline Adjustment.” Display
function can be limited to specific circuits or districts.).
105. Id. (narrowing display function to Southern District of California).
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2. Appellate Court Decisions Perpetuate Role-Reduction Disparities
Drug trafficking offenses are the most common crimes prosecuted in federal
courts.106 The defendants are most commonly apprehended while crossing into the
United States along the U.S.-Mexico border in California, Arizona, New Mexico, or
Texas.107 Thus, to the extent that circuit law actually impacts district court decisionmaking, the critical circuits are the Ninth, which encompasses California and
Arizona, the Tenth, which includes New Mexico, and the Fifth, covering Texas.108
Further, the Eleventh Circuit decisions are significant because that circuit includes
Florida,109 which is also a major entry point for northbound contraband. Finally, the
First Circuit, which includes Puerto Rico—and often includes interdictions in
international waters110—receives a significant share of mule and courier cases.
Among the problems with case law is that guideline changes liberalizing
mitigating role have not percolated into the circuits’ express interpretations. While
the effect is hard—or even impossible—to measure, fact-based, totality-ofcircumstances determinations give great deference to sentencing judges, and
sentencing decisions face little pressure on appeal.
For example, regarding couriers and mules, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits still
stubbornly rely on case law that predates significant guideline amendments. The
Ninth Circuit’s pre-2015 mitigating role cases, Rodriguez-Castro and Hurtado, rely on
precedent that preceded and is inconsistent with Amendment 635 (2001),
Amendment 640 (2002), Amendment 750 (2011), Amendment 755 (2011), and the
Commission’s consistent, published research into the structure and operation of
drug-trafficking organizations.111
The Ninth Circuit’s leading mitigating role case, United States v. Hurtado,112
lays out a standard that is contrary not only to the text of Section 3B1.2, but also to
the last few iterations of amendments113 aimed at curbing mitigating role denials.
While the court in Hurtado paid lip service to the guideline’s totality-of-the106. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2014,
at 40 fig. J, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federalsentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf (noting
that drug trafficking cases made up 31.7% of cases, more than any other category.) [https://
perma.cc/56VP-TYLE].
107. See U.S. SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL WASHINGTON,
D.C. (May 05, 2010) (testimony of Kevin L. Perkins and Anthony P. Placido), https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/news/testimony/drug-trafficking-violence-in-mexico-implications-for-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/R7HN-DWZX].
108. Louisiana and Mississippi do not share a land border with Mexico, but are positioned to
receive drug shipments by sea.
109. It also includes Alabama and Georgia.
110. These cases are frequently brought under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. See
generally 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-08 (2015).
111. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 3, United States
v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-50170).
112. See Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065.
113. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, amends. 635, 640, 755 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
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circumstances test,114 it disregarded that analysis by stating that any one of three
factors alone would have sufficed to deny mitigating role.115
For years, Federal and Community Defenders and other public defense
practitioners have cried out for justice in direct appeals, petitions for rehearing en
banc, and petitions for certiorari to no avail.116 Essentially, in the Ninth Circuit, even
if a defendant transports drugs for the first time with virtually no knowledge of the
drug trafficking organization that recruits her, she can be denied a role reduction—
and huge role-reduction-dependent decreases—(1) because the amount of contraband she has exceeds a certain quantity (a threshold apparently defined on the spot
by the sentencing court without empirical data); (2) because of the amount of money
the drug trafficking organization pays her (a threshold apparently also defined by
the sentencing court without empirical data); or (3) because she engaged in
a mundane preparatory action (e.g., making a trip to the DMV).117 The Ninth
Circuit’s single-factor analysis in Hurtado took hold as a mechanism to summarily
dispense with mitigating-role denial appeals.118
As Hurtado illustrated in his petition for rehearing,119 the Ninth Circuit’s
continued citation of cases like United States v. Lui,120 or United States v. Hursh,121
perpetuate “an unduly parsimonious attitude to the applicability of the role
adjustment to couriers and applies reasoning that is either inconsistent with later
amendments or was expressly abjured by the Sentencing Commission after those
decisions were filed.”122 Even as the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment was set to
take effect, the Ninth Circuit’s mitigating-role-denial review was approaching the
brevity of haiku writing.123 Yet, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the 2015 Mitigating
Role Amendment in 2016, in United States v. Quintero-Leyva, where it held that
district courts must consider the factors set out in the 2015 Amendment.124 The
114. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2 Comment 3(C); see also United States v. RodriguezCastro, 641 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011).
115. See Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (“It properly considered the quantity of drugs, the amount
paid to Hurtado, and the fact that he allowed the truck to be registered in his name. Any of these facts
alone may justify denial of a minor role.”) (citing Rodriguez-Castro, 641 F.3d at 1193); see also United States
v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 2000).
116. See, e.g., Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065.
117. See id. at 1069.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Valle-Mendevil, 619 F. App’x 660, 661 (9th Cir. 2015) (reciting
Hurtado’s holding).
119. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 3.
120. 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991).
121. 217 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2000).
122. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 3–4.
123. See United States v. Gaytan–Salim, 619 F. App’x 671 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming district
court mitigating role denial in seven short sentences).
124. See United States v. Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d 519, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2016). The court also
reversed two other cases heard on the same day: United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (9th
Cir. 2016) (involving a mule crossing in the pedestrian lane with 220 grams of meth who admitted to
crossing on previous occasions and received a fifty-seven-month sentence from Judge Burns), and
United States v. Enriquez, 650 F. App’x 360 (9th Cir. 2016) (adjusting a ninety-six-month sentence for
10.36 kilos of meth from 2012, and subsequently resentencing several times by Judge Benitez.).
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Ninth Circuit recognized some authority of the Sentencing Commission, in
requiring courts to consider the 2015 Amendment’s factors and applying the
Amendment retroactively on direct appeal.125 Yet, the Ninth Circuit did not
expressly address whether the Amendment superseded (or overruled) the
conflicting case law mentioned above.
Indeed, as other courts of appeal slowly take notice of the 2015 Mitigating
Role Amendment, its relation decades old case law remains unclear. In the adjacent
Fifth Circuit, the cornerstone mitigating role cases are almost thirty years old. The
Fifth Circuit still relies on two 1989 cases, United States v. Gallegos126 and United
States v. Buenrostro,127 to deny mitigating role in courier cases. In Gallegos, the court
upheld the denial of mitigating role reductions for a pair of defendants convicted of
importing just 100 grams of heroin,128 and spelled out a standard under which it is
virtually impossible to reverse district courts that deny defendants the mitigating
role reduction. One of the defendants in Gallegos fit the minimal role application
note to the letter; he was “recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction
involving a small amount of drugs.”129 In Buenrostro, the defendant was convicted
after transporting eighteen kilograms of heroin across the border in his car.130
Buenrostro argued he was entitled to a minimal role adjustment because drug
traffickers led him to believe he was transporting marijuana and he was hired as a
one-time courier—consistent with the minimal role application note.131 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of a mitigating role adjustment, reasoning
the judge acted within his discretion to deny the adjustment based on the quantity
of drugs.132
In late 2016, in United States v. Castro, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the 2015
Mitigating Role Amendment, but continued to rely on Buenrostro for the proposition
that a person could “‘be a courier without being substantially less culpable than the
average participant.’”133 The Castro decision appears to permit business as usual in
Fifth Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit emphasized that district courts must consider
the factors set forth in the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment, it affirmed the district
court’s sentence even though the district court failed to expressly address five
factors introduced by the amendment.134
Similarly, until recently, judges in the Middle District of Florida relied
anachronistically on a 1999 Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Rodriguez De
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d at 524.
See 868 F.2d 711, 712–13 (5th Cir. 1989).
See 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989).
868 F.2d at 712.
Id. at 713.
868 F.2d at 136.
Id. at 137.
See id. at 138–39.
United States v. Castro, 843 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Buenrostro, 868 F.2d at

134.
factors.”).

See id. at 613 n.4 (“The court did not err by not expressly weighing Amendment 794’s

138).
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Varon to deny role adjustments.135 The De Varon decision “discourages application
of the mitigating role adjustment ‘when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited
to her own act of importation’ or because the amount of drugs ‘may be the best
indication of the magnitude of the courier’s participation.’”136 In September 2016,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded in United States v. Cruickshank where
the district relied on drug quantity as the “only factor” for denying a role adjustment
under De Varon.137 The Eleventh Circuit, however, still referred to De Varon as its
leading case,138 and called for a future standard that will take into account De Varon
and the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment.139
Based on appellate courts’ apparent agnosticism regarding past amendments,
whether they will credit the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment remains an open
question. Further, it is also an open question whether assistant U.S. attorneys will
incorporate the amendment’s guidance into their plea negotiation. A functional,
role-based guideline would be much easier for judges, prosecutors, and probation
officers to follow and far easier to evaluate on appeal.
B. Courts, Prosecutors, Probation Officers, and Defense Attorneys Rely on Incomplete
Information about Drug-Trafficking Organizations’ Actual Structures
Chief among the challenges with establishing sentencing rules for drug
couriers and mules is the variation (perceived or speculated about) between
different courier roles.140 The Commission should look to empirical research to
provide courts with guidance as to how to interpret evidence regarding courier roles.
First, the acknowledged lack of qualitative data on drug-trafficking organizations
should caution courts in applying common (mis)perceptions regarding drugtrafficker roles. In fact, the rule of lenity141 should be invoked in role analysis. “The
rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose,
there remains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.’”142 In terms of
ambiguity or uncertainty, the Commission’s serial revisions to the Mitigating Role
135. United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 942–43 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
136. See Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 3 (citing United States v. Lormil, 551
F. App’x 542, 544 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding a Middle District of Florida district court justified
denying a mitigating role adjustment for a suitcase carrying courier with 2.5 kilograms of cocaine where
law enforcement could not locate the alleged leaders)).
137. 837 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2016).
138. Id. at 1192.
139. Id. at 1195.
140. Compare Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (denial of minor role proper based on quantity of drugs,
the amount courier was paid or the fact the courier allowed a vehicle to be registered in his name) with
Leitch, 2013 WL 753445, at *13–14 n.26 (describing the Attorney-General-authorized early disposition
program for drug courier cases in the Eastern District of New York, which generally provide for a
minimal role adjustment).
141. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 891 (“Especially in the interpretation of a
criminal statute subject to the rule of lenity, . . . [courts] cannot give the text a meaning that is different
from its ordinary, accepted meaning, and that disfavors the defendant” (citation omitted).).
142. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125,
139 (1998)).
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Guideline speak for themselves.143 These revisions—combined with dissonant
circuit court interpretations—demonstrate the requisite grievous ambiguity and
uncertainty in what makes one defendant “substantially less culpable than the
average participant.”144 Thus, where courts and parties are speculating about role,
ambiguous determinations should result in findings that favor defendants.
Second, emerging quantitative studies should caution courts from making too
much of a single courier’s role characteristics given the relative homogeneity
regarding key elements of their conduct.
1. Recent Quantitative Findings Tend to Flatten Out Variation Between Defendants
While the Guidelines require defendants to litigate their mitigating role
sentencing claims “from scratch” by laying out the relative roles of people in the
drug-trafficking organization that recruits them, federal prosecutors in border
districts refer to courier cases in remarkably generic terminology.145 Recent work by
former Assistant United States Attorney Caleb Mason with Social Scientist David
Bjerk illustrates the regularity of courier tasks and courier placement in the
economic status within drug trafficking organizations.146 Bjerk and Mason describe
their data set as being made up of “every federal border-smuggling case, or ‘border
bust’ . . . made at California ports of entry” from late 2006 to 2010.147
They find that couriers and mules vary in what types of drugs they cross in
what quantity, and in their pay.148 But on average, couriers’ economic positions visà-vis the enterprise they work for paint a picture of a uniformly powerless, unskilled
labor force.149
This author disagrees with Bjerk and Mason’s implication that drug-courier
work may be a rational way to earn a living, comparable to truck driving.150 Yet,
143.
See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, amends. 635, 640, 755 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
144. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.2.
145. See David Bjerk & Caleb Mason, The Market for Mules: Risk and Compensation of CrossBorder Drug Couriers, 39 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 58, 59 (2014); see generally Human Rights Watch, supra
note 14, at 12 (“As one former US Attorney told Human Rights Watch, [¶] ‘[t]he public simply does
not realize how many low-level guys are in [federal] prison. . . . We lock up the lowest fruit in drug
conspiracies.’”).
146. See Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145.
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id. at 61.
149. Id. at 59.
150. Id. The authors substantially discount non-economic risks taken by couriers and mules.
Bjerk and Mason overstate the agency exerted by couriers and mules, arguing that if a mule is successful
twice a month, and is able to avoid arrest for a year, she could earn as much as a beginner truck driver.
Id. They also claim “mules are arguably quite well paid for their courier work, generally being paid one
and two thousand dollars for a day’s work.” Id. at 70. Simple dollar assessments, however, are
problematic. Their conclusions both understate the magnitude of the risk of transporting drugs for a
drug trafficking organization, and undervalue the lives of the desperate people who accept the work.
In the years covered by Bjerk and Mason’s data sample, a colossal number of deaths were attributed to
the drug war. From 2007 to 2012, the Mexican government calculated an astonishing 121,683 drug war
deaths. Más de 121 Mil Muertos, el Saldo de la Narcoguerra de Calderón: Inegi, [More than 121-Thousand
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their calculations are valuable in resolving many misconceptions that worry
sentencing judges and the appellate judges scrutinizing their decisions.
Courier and mule work is virtually a dead-end path. Bjerk and Mason estimate
that around one-in-ten or one-in-twenty drug loads are detected.151 While many
people work in dangerous jobs in North America, the danger of a multiyear
incarceration term dwarfs other work risks both in certainty and in magnitude. It
would seem that couriers would have better chances making a living betting on
horses with borrowed money.
Courier work offers a temporary income increase that would be unlikely in
most other jobs in the border region. In fact, that is very frequently the reason
people are willing to accept drug-trafficking organizations’ propositions. Often
drug-trafficking organization recruiters—like others offering dangerous and risky
employment—deliberately seek out people in dire circumstances to make them an
offer they can’t refuse.152 Further, the border region has provided an increasingly
vulnerable labor pool in the last couple decades.153 The temptation of short-term

Deaths, the Balance of Calderon’s Drug War: Inegi] PROCESO ( July 30, 2013), http://
www.proceso.com.mx/?p=348816 [https://perma.cc/9BZK-U2JT] (showing statistics from
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography). Given the virtual eventuality of being arrested
and imprisoned—along with the possibility of being killed—being a drug courier or mule is a
tremendously irrational decision, which requires either desperation or some other characteristic
rendering the person incapable of making a rational decision. Further, mules who carry drugs
directly on, or inside, their person face risk of injury or even death. See, e.g., Steven Morris, Detecting
System Criticized After ‘Drug Mule’ Death; THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2007), http://
www.TheGuardian.com/uk/2007/dec/10/immigrationpolicy.drugsandalcohol [https://perma.cc/
484J-CGX7]. Couriers typically come from countries in Latin America and the “global south” that tend
to experience the “drug war” in the literal sense. See Sonia N. Lawrence & Toni Williams, Swallowed
Up: Drug Couriers at the Borders of Canadian Sentencing, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 285, 285–86 (2006).
151. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 71.
152. See MARIO PUZO, THE GODFATHER 37 (1969).
153. “For drug trafficking [organizations], NAFTA . . . provided both the infrastructure and
the [labor] pool to facilitate smuggling, especially during the Fox administration when much of the
demand for cheap [labor] was transferred to Chinese sweat shops.” PETER WATT & ROBERTO
ZEPEDA, DRUG WAR MEXICO 161 (1998). Factory “maquila” jobs in Mexican border cities increased
fourfold from the 1980s to the 1990s, but following the North American Free Trade Agreement, these
maquilas began to close, expanding the cartels’ labor pool. See id. at 159–60. Mexico, a land of intense
poverty and extraordinary wealth disparity, tucked under the belly of the United States, presents vast
pockets of people vulnerable to drug trafficking enterprises’ manipulation. Id. at 230 (noting that in
Mexico, “the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, acquires on average another million dollars every hour,
while the majority live on less than two dollars a day”). In border regions, Mexico’s economic plight is
particularly salient. Id.
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financial relief comes at the cost of the extraordinary risk of many years of
imprisonment154 and death by cartel violence.155
The empirical market analysis possible about courier labor—that cases can be
bundled by the thousands and speculated over in economic terms—stands in stark
contrast to what happens in sentencing courts. On the one hand, point-A-to-pointB couriers are so standardized that they can be commodified as a uniform labor
force (thus rendering rather benign the characteristics and motivations of the
individuals involved) 156; on the other hand, the facts of individual cases, when
prosecuted and sentenced, represent devastating acts of disqualification from
mercy.
For the purposes of sentencing couriers and mules, the most informative
aspect of quantitative studies is that they are possible. Overall, such studies
demonstrate the “McDonaldization” of drug-trafficking enterprises in the face of
the drug war.157 Thus, in courier and mule cases, a colossal disconnect exists
between how the highly structured, multination-drug-trafficking organizations
impersonally treat their dispensable underlings and how courts, prosecutors, and
probation officers treat them when prosecuting and sentencing them.
2. The Mitigating Role Guideline Fails at Providing Sufficient Clarity and Detail to Sentencing
Courts, Prosecutors, and Probation Officers
Lacking clear guidance from the Commission, case law, and statutes, judges
and advocates problematically and inaccurately characterize drug amounts as
indicative of defendants’ roles and their positions in the enterprises that recruit
them. Commission guidance—for decades—gave the example of a one-time
transaction with a “small amount” of drugs as an offense that would qualify for
mitigating role.158 But no one can agree on what a “small amount” of drugs is. Four
154. Bjerk and Mason calculate expected sentence value based on correlations between courier
pay and sentences for those who are arrested and convicted. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 62–67.
Smuggling certain drugs pays more than others; and as the drug quantity goes up, the possible sentence
goes up and so does the pay. Id. The cartels can be seen to operate like a casino: couriers bet years of
their freedom—the number of which is now known to social scientists following years of data collection
and regression analysis—in exchange for a possible cash payout. Given the complexity of calculating
such sentence values and the generalized “labor costs” for couriers and mules, there is virtually no
chance that couriers bargain with their handlers as to the amount of risk they will shoulder and what
compensation they are willing to expect.
155. See PROCESO, supra note 150.
156. It is precisely these mundane details, which should be granted the benefit of the rule of
lenity under the current mitigating role regime. As described supra Section III.B, where offense factors
could be reasonably seen as mitigating or aggravating, courts should err toward the interpretation
favoring the defendant.
157. See GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY (2007). Ritzer sees the fast
food industry as a paramount example of a modern societal trend to value efficiency, predictability, and
calculability above all else. This trend is manifest in multinational drug trafficking enterprises where
labor is standardized and compartmentalized. Just as the fast food industry divides labor up into
unskilled tasks, so do drug cartels.
158. Prior to Amendment 635 in 2001, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 Comment 2, read: “It is intended that
the downward adjustment for a minimal participant will be used infrequently. It would be appropriate,
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years of Southern California border-bust data revealed that drug couriers carried an
average of sixty kilograms and a median of thirty.159 In contrast, circuit court cases
miss the mark by affirming mitigating role denial based on quantity for quantities
in relatively low ranges.160
If anything, under Section 3B1.2’s comparison to co-participants,161 high
quantity may very well cut the other direction. That a drug-trafficking operation is
transporting a large quantity of drugs is indicative of an organization that contains
high-level drug traffickers with greater culpability. In other words, if an organization
is capable of trafficking larger quantities of drugs, it is likely to have more higher
culpability participants. Larger drug trafficking enterprises—with greater need to
launder their proceeds and establish their place among competing organizations—
may be more likely to engage in high-level financial and violent crimes thereby
elevating a given enterprise’s average participant.
Judges’ “assessments” of trust within the criminal enterprise understandably
lack nuance. The cases coming before courts all look similar—reflecting patterns
of enforcement rather than enterprise structure—and mask the critical dimensions
of the enterprise. Drug cartels are run by violence, which is largely facilitated by
militarization in Latin American drug-export and drug-transit countries and whitecollar crime.162 Thus, when courts magnify individual case nuances—whether a
courier owned the car, or the car was registered in her name, etc.—it distracts from
the compelling similarities shared by the “class” of drug couriers.
for example, for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to
offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier
for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs.” U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 3B1.3
Comment 2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2000).
159. Bjerk & Mason, supra note 145, at 61. Notably, the data set includes mules crossing the
border on foot with presumably much smaller quantities. Subtracting pedestrians, both the mean and
median would be significantly higher.
160. See supra Section III.A.2; Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1195 (maintaining drug quantity as a
permissible factor—among others—for determining mitigating role eligibility after the 2015 Mitigating
Role Amendment).
161. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.2, at 364–66.
162. WATT & ZEPEDA, supra note 153, at 232 (noting that in Mexico, “the financial and political
structure that allows drug trafficking to flourish has remained all but untouched. . . . [ D]rug trafficking
in Mexico has been, for a long time, facilitated by official complicity, by white collar crime. . . .
[N]arcotrafficking over the last century has been a component part of the state apparatus.”). A more
recent example of Mexican state-cartel collusion is the forced disappearance of forty-three students
in Guerrero in 2014, which was carried out through coordinated efforts by drug traffickers and
law enforcement officers. See generally Francisco Goldman, Mexico’s Missing Forty-Three: One Year,
Many Lies, and a Theory that Might Make Sense, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2015) https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/mexicos-missing-forty-three-one-year-many-lies-and-atheory-that-might-make-sense [https://perma.cc/9R3K-ZWA2]. A larger example is the case of
HSBC’s being caught laundering at least $881 million in drug proceeds, which it received as bulk cash
deposits. See generally Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA
N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.Justice.gov/opa/pr/HSBC-Holdings-Plc-andHSBC-Bank-USA-NA-Admit-Anti-Money-Laundering-and-Sanctions-Violations [https://perma.cc/
NRS3-EC5B].
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
As described throughout, the Commission has not succeeded in over twentyfive years of tinkering to create a workable mitigating role guideline that achieves
the paramount goal of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. Further, the
amendments that have been made have failed to take hold in most federal circuits.163
Thus, in addition to revising the mitigating role guideline, the Commission should
act quickly to decouple mitigating-role-dependent guidelines by modifying roledependent guidelines, role cap and the methamphetamine enhancement (Sections
2D1.1(a)(5) and (b)(5)).164
A. Section 3B1.2 Mitigating Role Should Contain a Functional Role Analysis
During the comment process for the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment,
Federal and Community Defenders provided several meaningful comments that the
Commission did not act upon. First, Defenders critiqued the lukewarm language
change from “is not precluded from consideration” to “may receive an adjustment,”
noting that desirable language would indicate that defendants “should generally
receive an adjustment.”165 In addition to the obstacles mentioned above, effective
Guideline amendment is delayed by a lack of representation on the Commission by
the most relevant stakeholders. While federal prosecutors have a permanent seat at
the Commission’s table, Federal and Community Defenders, a group uniquely
situated as a proper counterbalance, is kept outside formative Commission
developments.166 Their voice is particularly important because Defenders are poised
to target sources of injustice that would escape the Commission’s bird’s-eye analysis
of sentencing issues, and would be less likely to be perceived by prosecutors and
probation department officials.
Unlike previous amendments, adding a provision to allow role-based
mitigating role grants for couriers, mules, and even street-level dealers would be far
easier to address on appeal and may plausibly percolate up through deferential
appellate standards. If “courier” and “mule” have clear definitions under the
Guidelines, and the facts support a determination that a defendant is a courier, it is
more likely that a circuit court would step in to reverse a district court’s rolereduction denial.

163. See, e.g., United States v. Hurtado, 760 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014); see also supra Section
III.A.2. But see United States v. Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d 519, 524 (9th Cir. 2016).
164. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (b)(5).
165. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 1.
166. Id. As of November 2016, six of seven commissioners were district attorneys, state
attorneys general, or assistant U.S. attorneys before becoming commissioners. About the Commissioners,
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/commissioners [https://perma.cc/
AZ8P-VVT4] (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
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B. Section 2D1.1(a)(5)’s Role Cap Provision Should Include Average Participants, Not
Just Minor and Minimal Participants
While the Mitigating Role Guideline necessarily must leave room for
application to myriad other offenses, the role cap provision applies only to drug
offenses. Thus, the Role Cap guideline is the ideal place to “clean up” mitigating
role application issues and correct for the underuse of mitigating role. Decoupling
Role Cap from Mitigating Role will insulate low-level defendants from errors and
inconsistencies in how courts apply mitigating role.
The Role Cap provision makes exceptions for base offense levels based on the
Drug Quantity Table:
The offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth in
subsection (c), except that if (A) the defendant receives an adjustment
under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role); and (B) the base offense level under
subsection (c) is (i) level 32, decrease by 2 levels; (ii) level 34 or level 36,
decrease by 3 levels; or (iii) level 38, decrease by 4 levels. If the resulting
offense level is greater than level 32 and the defendant receives the 4-level
(“minimal participant”) reduction in §3B1.2(a), decrease to level 32.167
In effect, the Role Cap provision recalibrates base offense levels for any
defendants who can prove that they qualify for mitigating role reductions and have
a drug-quantity-based offense level of thirty-two or higher. The last sentence of the
provision applies additional reductions for defendants deemed minimal participants
whose original offense level is thirty-six or higher. In that case, the guideline
instructs courts to reduce the offense level to thirty-two. In other words, it reflects
a policy choice that no minimal participant should have an offense level higher than
thirty-two.
The Commission implemented Role Cap through Amendment 640 expressly
with couriers, mules and other low-level functionaries in mind.168 Citing couriers
and mules as examples of defendants whose actual culpability was not accurately
reflected in the amount of drugs they transport, the Commission sought to ratchet
down the amount-linked sentencing ranges:
[T]he amendment modifies [§ 2D1.1(a)(5)] to provide a maximum base
offense level of level 30 if the defendant receives and adjustment under §
3B1.2 (Mitigating Role). The maximum base offense level somewhat limits
the sentencing impact of drug quantity for offenders who perform
relatively low level trafficking functions, have little authority in the drug
trafficking organization, and have a lower degree of individual culpability
(e.g., “mules” or “couriers” qualify for a mitigating role adjustment). [¶]
This part of the amendment responds to concerns that base offense levels
derived from the Drug Quantity Table in § 2D1.1 overstate the culpability

167. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5), at 150.
168. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. II, amend. 640, reason for amend., at 258
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2002).
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of certain drug offenders who meet the criteria for a mitigating role
adjustment under § 3B1.2.169
The rationale behind Role Cap, that the Drug Quantity Table overstates
culpability for certain defendants, remains unquestioned. Indeed, it is supported by
the Commission’s consistent, nationwide research on the structure and operation
of drug-trafficking organizations.170 The Drugs-Minus-Two Amendment lends
broader support for the proposition that the Drug Quantity Table is indefensibly
harsh.171
Yet, by limiting Role Cap application to defendants who can prove they are
substantially less culpable than average participants and thus receive a mitigating
role adjustment, the guideline presumes a functioning mitigating role guideline. As
illustrated throughout this Note, the mitigating role guideline remains problematic,
and circuit courts have been largely unresponsive to amendment attempts. Thus,
the intent behind Amendment 640 should be decoupled from mitigating role. That
is, Section 2D1.1(a)(5) should be amended to ensure its deployment for all
“relatively low level trafficking functions, [who] have little authority in the drug
trafficking organization, and have a lower degree of individual culpability (e.g.,
‘mules’ or ‘couriers’ . . . ).”172 This specific modification will be best accomplished
by extending § 2D1.1(a)(5) to all drug-trafficking defendants who do not qualify for
an aggravating role as follows:
The offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth in
subsection (c), except that if (A) the defendant does not receives an
adjustment under §3B1.2 §3B1.1 (Mitigating Aggravating Role); and (B)
the base offense level under subsection (c) is (i) level 32, decrease by 2
levels; (ii) level 34 or level 36, decrease by 3 levels; or (iii) level 38, decrease
by 4 levels. . . .173
With that simple modification, Section 2D1.1(a)(5) will undoubtedly cap
offense levels for defendants in low-level functions with little authority, and lower
individual culpability. But the analysis will be liberated from the mitigating role
guideline’s vague requirement to compare each defendant with so-called average
participants combined with treacherous circuit court jurisprudence supporting
mitigating role denial for a number of reasons that fail to reflect defendants’
function, authority or culpability.
The expansion of Role Cap to “average,” not just minor or minimal
participants, may be vulnerable to criticism on speculation that some very
detrimental drug traffickers will “slip through the cracks” and receive too low a

169. Id. at 259.
170. See supra Section II.
171. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, supp. to app. C, amend. 782, at 64–71 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2014).
172. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. II, amend. 640, reason for amend., at 259
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2002).
173. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(a)(5) (with this Note’s proposed amendments).
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sentence.174 This is unlikely, however, given the availability of other sentencing
enhancements including, for example, using firearms,175 and abusing a position of
trust,176—not to mention, judges’ expansive discretion to sentence above the a
properly calculated guideline range under section 3553(a).
As a final note to this Section, this modest modification would effectively
breathe the rule of lenity into role determinations in drug cases. At least for Role
Caps, defendants in ambiguous situations would be given the benefit of the doubt.
Low-level defendants often legitimately lack the requisite knowledge to overcome
their burden to prove their roles are minor or minimal. After all, lacking authority
in the organization, they lack access to information about other participants. Like
fast-food-restaurant employees, couriers and mules have a “street level” view of the
organization. Thus, this amendment will serve as a step away from presuming drug
defendants should receive sentences fit for kingpins and a step toward requiring the
government to first prove elevated status—beginning with proving that a defendant
was a manager, a supervisor, or leader within the meaning of Section 3B1.1 in order
to negate Role Cap application.
C. Section 2D1.1(b)(5)’s Increase for Methamphetamine Should Exclude Average
Participants, Not Just Minor and Minimal Participants
While the methamphetamine transporter remains largely similar to
transporters of other drugs, she is treated disproportionately worse by the
Guidelines. First, far smaller quantities of methamphetamine trigger higher
guideline ranges.177 Second, a two-level increase applies to methamphetamine
importation and to no other drug. Section 2D1.1(b)(5), which provides:
If (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine
or methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or
methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew
were imported unlawfully, and (B) the defendant is not subject to
an adjustment under §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), increase by 2 levels.178
Thus, under Section 2D1.1(b)(5), if a courier or mule defendant has been
recruited to transport methamphetamine—and is denied a mitigating role
adjustment—her offense is increased by two levels.179 Section 2D1.1(b)(5) applies
174. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.2, at 364–66.
175. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2K2.4, at 269–70.
176. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 3B1.3, at 367–68.
177. See infra text accompanying note 178 (discussing the Comprehensive Methamphetamine
Act of 1996).
178. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5), at 145. Section 2D1.1(b)(5) was added in 1997 as
part of multipart Amendment 555, in response to the “Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act
of 1996, Pub. L. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099, including the directives to the Commission in sections 301
and 303 of that Act.” U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. I, amend. 555, at 516. Congress directed the
Commission in section 301 of the Act to cut each base offense level’s drug quantity in half for
methamphetamine (e.g. where three kilograms of methamphetamine triggered a given base offense
level, that quantity dropped to 1.5 kilograms for same offense level). Id.
179. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5), at 151.
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to a significant number of cases. Nationally, in 2014, there were 6229
methamphetamine trafficking cases, which accounted for over twenty-nine percent
of all drug trafficking cases.180 Notably, the Commission’s justification for adding
Section 2D1.1(b)(5) to the guidelines was not justified by any difference in the
role of defendants in methamphetamine offenses. Rather, it was based on a
generic assertion that evidence indicated “a recent, substantial increase in the
importation of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals used to manufacture
methamphetamine.”181
Methamphetamine has harmfully affected communities throughout the
United States.182 While the public has become increasingly disillusioned about the
“war on drugs,” as hysteria mounted regarding methamphetamine,183 the
government deployed the same strategies against methamphetamine trafficking as
it has against heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.184 Nonetheless, there is no evidence
that the functional role of a low-level courier or mule is any different for this
prohibited drug than for any other. Further, as many practitioners report, the drug
trafficking organizations often tell a courier that what she is transporting is
marijuana (possibly to assuage any remorse related to involvement with the more
harmful drug), or deliberately keep the courier in the dark about what the substance
is so they will work for less remuneration.185
The following simple modification will alleviate the risk of this provision being
applied to defendants who are unfairly denied a mitigating role adjustment or who
do not have sufficient information to prove they are substantially less culpable than
the average participant.
If (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or
methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or
methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were
imported unlawfully, and (B) the defendant is not subject to an adjustment
under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) §3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), increase by 2
levels.186
The revised guideline will thus apply Section 2D1.1(b)(5) only to those drug
traffickers with a demonstrated aggravating role. While an effective mitigating role
180. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENTENCING STAT., tbl. 33
(2014), http://www.USSC.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table33.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9ML-PWC9] [hereinafter
F ED . SENTENCING STAT.].
181. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, app. C, vol. I, amend. 555, reason for amend., at 517.
182. See WILLIAM GARRIOTT, POLICING METHAMPHETAMINE: NARCOPOLITICS IN RURAL
AMERICA 4–5, 22–25 (2011).
183. See America’s Most Dangerous Drug, N EWSWEEK , Aug. 7, 2005, http://www.
Newsweek.com/Americas-Most-Dangerous-Drug-117493 [https://perma.cc/Y6BY-V4WL].
184. See GARRIOTT, supra note 182, at 34–35.
185. Thus, in order to construct a factual basis in these cases, many pleas read something like,
“I knowingly imported a prohibited substance which I admit the government could prove is
methamphetamine.”
186. U.S.S.G., supra note 8, § 2D1.1(b)(5) at 151 (with this Note’s proposed amendments).
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guideline would alleviate the need for this modification, decades of adjustments
have justified cynicism about such adjustments taking hold. And even a clear
mitigating role guideline would not necessarily fix the problem faced by the most
poorly informed couriers and mules who cannot generate sufficient evidence to
prove their role is substantially less than average.
While not all of the methamphetamine offenders in 2014 were exposed to the
two-level increase,187 a sizable number of the 4325 cases receiving no role
adjustment188 likely suffered the two-point adjustment. Further, an enormous
portion of methamphetamine defendants are couriers, and are thus caught in the
limbo discussed throughout this Note.
This Note’s proposed modification to Section 2D1.1(b)(5) would prevent
similar outcomes in the future, and would present no real negative consequences to
enforcement efforts and government interest in punishing drug offenders with
elevated roles. As long as the government met its burden of showing aggravating
role,189 Section 2D1.1(b)(5) would still be activated. But borderline mitigating role
cases—those likely to get a different outcome depending on the judge adjudicating
them—would be spared the plus-two increase. Therefore, the paramount policy
objective of avoiding disparities among similarly situated defendants would be
served by this revision. Since only 6.1% of methamphetamine trafficking
defendants receive an aggravating adjustment,190 the dangers of misapplication are
slight.
D. The Mitigating Role Guideline or the Aberrant Behavior Guideline
Should Be Amended to Distinguish the Two
The Mitigating Role Guideline’s direction to compare defendants to “average
participants” leads to additional application issues, which, in some courts, includes
analyzing whether couriers or mules had time to reflect on their involvement
(aberrant behavior) and how necessary they are to the overall drug-trafficking
enterprise.191

187. The offense must involve “importation” or manufacture using chemicals known to have
been “imported unlawfully.” Id.
188. See FED. SENTENCING STAT., supra note 180, tbl. 40, http://www.USSC.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table40.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EGZ7-QX53].
189. Most circuits have held the burden for an adjustment falls on the party seeking it. See, e.g.,
United States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Dolan, 701
F. Supp. 138, 139–40 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (placing the burden of proof for “acceptance of responsibility”
on the government because the court believed that the government would have as much access as had
the defendant to the information necessary to establish whether the defendant had accepted
responsibility).
190. See FED. SENTENCING STAT., supra note 180, tbl. 40.
191. Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (“That [the defendant’s] supervisors, organizers, recruiters, and
leaders may have above-average culpability—and thus are subject to aggravating role enhancements
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1—doesn’t mean that [the defendant] is ‘substantially less culpable than the
average participant.’” (emphasis omitted)).
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The Commission should clarify that being a repeat courier, or carrying out
other mundane tasks, does not preclude a mitigating role adjustment. In other
words, a functional role analysis should disentangle the actions of couriers from the
requirements for an aberrant behavior departure.192 The Aberrant Behavior
Guideline allows for a downward departure under Section 5K2.20 for qualifying
offenses where “the defendant committed a single criminal occurrence or single
criminal transaction that (1) was committed without significant planning; (2) was of
limited duration; and (3) represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an
otherwise law-abiding life.”193 But some judges’ findings under Section 3B1.2
appear to confuse role with aberrant behavior.194 The Guidelines should be
amended to clarify that a lack of aberrancy should not foreclose mitigating role
reductions.
The Aberrant Behavior departure serves a distinct purpose from the mitigating
role adjustment, a sort of sorting function for what could be considered a class of
offenses with meaningfully underdeveloped intent. The Guidelines should direct
attention to the defendant’s functional role and clarify that—barring exceptional
circumstances—low-level couriers are not to be disqualified from role reductions
based on a lack of aberrancy.
Although preparation and repetition weigh against aberrant behavior
departures, couriers’ overall roles in drug trafficking organizations do not
meaningfully change. On average, couriers are compensated at a trivial percentage
of the value of the drugs they transport.195 Even if they are compensated
incrementally higher for riskier endeavors, couriers’ statures in the enterprises do
not change. Trusted drug-trafficking associates do not shoulder the risks of
personally transporting drugs across the international border gauntlet of inspectors,
detection equipment and drug-sniffing dogs. Nevertheless, some judges have found
that couriers and mules had elevated roles because they engaged in low-skilled
preparatory activity for drug-smuggling activities. For example, appellate courts
have affirmed mitigating-role denials based on defendants making practice runs
(crossing the border first without drugs), or registering cars in their names.196 While
the Mitigating Role Guideline has been in effect for decades, courts are still
struggling with how to interpret it even for what have become ordinary scenarios
for sentencing judges. In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument

192. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K2.20(b).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1069 (holding that a defendant’s allowing a car to be registered
in his name was a valid ground for denial of a mitigating role adjustment). Allowing the car registration
to proceed involves planning and duration, and would therefore disqualify someone from relief based
on aberrancy. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at § 5K2.20(b). See also Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9, LopezDiaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (No. 14-50050) (9th Cir. 2016) (remanded where district court denied a role
reduction for defendant who admitted to importing drugs into the United States by foot).
195. Drug couriers are extremely cheap in relation to the value of the drugs they cross. See Bjerk
& Mason, supra note 145, at 67–68.
196. Hurtado, 760 F.3d at 1067–68.
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in three cases, which are exemplars of how two Southern District of California
judges have clung to such superficial role tests, United States v. Lopez-Diaz, United
States v. Enriquez, and United States v. Quintero-Leyva.197 As discussed above in
Section III.0, the court published an opinion in Quintero-Leyva without directly
stating whether prior case law remained valid.198
Even the severest of advice to early Guidelines drafters recommended that
first-time drug offenders rarely serve sentences over three years.199 The Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), in its 1996 Commentary to the Commission made
specific sentencing recommendations based on the type/amount of drugs, the
participant’s role, and whether it was the offender’s first, second, or third drug
offense conviction.200 While longer sentences were recommended for drug
defendants with prior drug trafficking convictions, substantially lower sentences
were recommended for first-time couriers.201 Thus, if a courier is instructed by her
handler to do a practice run, or if she does courier work on more than one occasion,
she should not be proscribed from a mitigating role adjustment.
E. The Mitigating Role Guideline Should Be Amended with Unequivocal Language to
Disavow Indispensability Determinations
The 2015 Amendment advises, in lukewarm terms, against denying a
mitigating role adjustment based on so-called “indispensability” to a drugtrafficking enterprise.202 The guideline language was changed to state that “certain
types of [indispensable] defendants” now “may receive” a mitigating role
adjustment.203 Before the Amendment, defendants were merely “‘not precluded
from consideration for’ a mitigating role adjustment.”204
The Amendment does not meaningfully address what practitioners have long
pointed out are unfair “indispensability justifications”205 upheld by circuit courts
and apparently permitted by the Guidelines. In the 2015 amendment cycle, Federal
and Community Defenders and others cautioned the Commission to include in
its amendment language that would dissuade courts from denying mitigating role

197. United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 650 F. App’x 359 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing a mule crossing
in the pedestrian lane with 220 grams of methamphetamine, admitted to crossing on previous occasions,
and received a fifty-seven-month sentence); United States v. Enriquez, 650 F. App’x 360 (9th Cir. 2016)
(issuing a 96-month sentence to an automobile courier for 10.36 kilograms of methamphetamine in
2012; the defendant was later issued the same sentence several times after reversal on appeal).
198. See Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d at 522–24 (remanding with instructions to consider Section
3B1.2’s newly listed factors, but not establishing a clear relationship between Ninth Circuit precedent
and the 2015 Mitigating Role Amendment).
199. Meierhoefer, supra note 7, at 34.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C, amend. 794, at 118.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Mitigating Role Statements, supra note 68, at 11.
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based on the “indispensability” of a defendant’s action.206 In a statement to the
Commission, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers President,
Theodore Simon, wrote:
[T]he commentary should make clear that defendants who have played a
lesser role in the offense are entitled to a mitigating role reduction even
if the relatively minor role was “indispensable to carrying out the
plan.” Arguably, every behavior that is part of criminal conduct could be
indispensable to the completion of the conduct, but that does not make
every actor equally valuable or equally culpable in the overall scheme.
Sands’ analogy of drug couriers to delivery truck drivers is completely
apropos. A business establishment may not be able to sell its merchandise
if the delivery driver does not transport the goods to the retail store, but
truck drivers are easily replaceable and minimally paid in the overall scheme
of the business. Couriers who do nothing more than transport from
manufacturers to dealers, for little compensation, are less culpable than
those who manufacture contraband and those who sell it for large
profits.207
This clarification is necessary because—lacking clear Commission
guidance—some courts have habitually disqualified defendants from mitigating
role adjustments where their functional tasks and responsibilities are insignificant
relative to their managers, supervisors, kingpins, and others with specials skills or
ownership interests in contraband.208 Common sense would suggest that the new
“may receive” language will do little to discourage district court evaluations, which
are buttressed not only by permissive circuit case law, but also by assumptions about
defendants.
As discussed above in Section III.B.1, the concentration of high-density,
economically depressed communities on the southwest border is a relatively recent
phenomenon. This mass migration co-occurred with the rise of Mexican drug
trafficking organization and the shift of the importation zone from the eastern
United States to the southwestern United States.209 Thus, drug trafficking
organizations found themselves in control of vast trafficking corridors, enabled by
Mexican law enforcement and white-collar complicity, and with access to a stable

206. Id. (explaining that “[f ]ar too many courts have ruled that low-level, easily replaceable
persons do not qualify for a minor role adjustment because they are an ‘indispensable’ part of the
criminal scheme or played a ‘critical role,’” and noting as an example that “the Sixth Circuit has expressly
held that ‘[a] defendant whose participation is indispensable to the carrying out of the plan is not entitled
to a role reduction.’”).
207. Letter from Theodore Simon, President, National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission, NACDL Comments on
Proposed Amendments for 2015 Cycle at 6 (March 18, 2015), http://nacdl.org/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=36638&libID=36608.
208. See U.S.S.G., supra note 8, at app. C.
209. See WATT & ZEPEDA, supra note 153, at 159–60.
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supply of inexpensive labor.210 The laborers suffer the brunt of enforcement efforts
as frontline fodder in the drug war.211
Further, the 2015 Amendment makes indispensability arguments even more
tempting for the unwary. If courts are to evaluate a courier’s role vis-à-vis
immediately related participants, the concept of indispensability is distorted. The
courier—usually an unskilled pedestrian or automobile driver—appears far more
significant when her actions are placed under the judicial microscope. Others
presumably grew or manufactured the drugs, packaged the drugs, financed the
operation, and secured safe passage to the border, but without that particular redhanded courier, the drugs would have rotted in a warehouse in Tijuana or Nogales.
While labeling a courier “indispensable” may be correct in a purely
philosophical sense, it frustrates practical sentencing purposes. Evaluating
indispensability conflates role analysis with causation and permits the most
attenuated levels of causation.212 Such an evaluation is akin to calling a gas station
attendant “indispensable” to the problem of global warming. Causation is dealt with
in every criminal case213 and therefore should not be double-counted against
relatively low-level defendants at sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Under the current Guidelines, low-level drug couriers and mules remain at
extraordinary risk of receiving sentences intended to punish drug kingpins. The
reforms proposed in this Note would decouple Role Cap and the
Methamphetamine enhancement from mitigating role, and aim to lessen the impact
of errors. Amending mitigating role to distinguish it from the aberrant behavior
departure analysis and disentangle indispensability analyses will promote more just
and consistent outcomes between federal circuits and among judges within
jurisdictions. Most importantly, these changes recommended herein will help
prevent drug couriers and mules—low-level, and often vulnerable, actors within
larger trafficking schemes—from facing overly harsh penalties.
Critically, the proposed changes are relatively simple, easy and effective steps.
While the relationship between the advisory Guidelines and case law remains
tenuous, these proposals are at the very least a step in the right direction toward the
goal of correcting the unduly harsh and unpredictable sentencing regime, which
results in unwarranted sentencing disparities.

210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The traditional understanding of but-for causation is that “[c]onduct is the cause of a
result” if “it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.” Burrage,
134 S. Ct. at 887–88 (internal quotations omitted).
213. “When a crime requires ‘not merely conduct but also a specified result of conduct,’ a
defendant generally may not be convicted unless his conduct is ‘both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the
“legal” cause (often called the “proximate cause”) of the result.’” Id. at 887.

